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INTRODUCTION
In July 2010, Crystal Byrd decided to lease and then purchase a
laptop from a local rental company, Aspen Way, a franchisee of
Aaron’s Incorporated.1  In December 2010, after Mrs. Byrd made her
final payment and became the owner of the laptop, an employee of
Aspen Way came to her home to repossess her computer under a mis-
taken belief that she had defaulted on a payment.2  During their con-
versation, the employee showed her a picture of her husband, Brian
Byrd, sitting in front of her laptop only hours before.3
Aaron’s Incorporated, through its franchisee Aspen Way, had
been remotely accessing Mrs. Byrd’s laptop without her knowledge or
consent by utilizing a spy software, DesignerWare’s PC Rental Agent,
installed on the machine.4  Although the software was designed as a
mechanism to track a rental laptop if it was lost or needed to be recov-
ered, Aaron’s franchisees were using the software for much more than
that.  The “Detective Mode” on the software allowed Aaron’s employ-
ees to receive e-mails containing keystrokes, screenshots, and webcam
pictures from a leased computer while it was connected to the In-
ternet.5  Although this type of technology has existed for at least five
years, the average consumer remains oblivious to the dangers that the
Internet presents to personal privacy.6  Information such as bank
statements, addresses, Social Security numbers, and phone numbers
can be intercepted and stored on the servers of a company using this
type of spyware.7  Remote access to webcams without detection is a
shocking thing; consumers are likely unaware of this danger to their
privacy and are unprepared.  If you imagine the type of actions that
1 See Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., C.A. No. 11-101, 2011 WL 2672009, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June
16, 2011), report and recommendation adopted sub nom, Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., C.A. No. 11-101,
2011 WL 2672204 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2011).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at *4–5.
5 See Complaint at *2, In re Aaron’s, Inc., No. 122-3264, 2013 WL 5835421 (F.T.C.
Oct. 22, 2013).
6 See, e.g., id. at *1 (“Since at least 2009 through January 2012, some Aaron’s franchis-
ees licensed a software product known as PC Rental Agent from DesignerWare . . . and
installed it on computers rented to consumers.”); Nicholas W. Allard, The Globalization of
Privacy and Security in Cyberspace: Government, Law, and Society in the Twenty-First Century On-
line World, in UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL ISSUES OF COMPUTER FORENSICS 53, 63 (2013)
(“[T]he United States does not yet have an organized and determined public constituency
that is advocating for the protection of individual privacy rights.”).
7 See Byrd, 2011 WL 2672009, at *5.
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may occur in front of a webcam, or the type of information that may
be present on the screen of a computer at any given time, the pos-
sibilities of humiliation, invasion, and embarrassment are endless.
The Byrds brought suit in federal court under part of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act, the Wiretap Act, as well as the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.8  The Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) gave the Byrds a private cause of action and the
right to sue for injunctive relief.9  However, the court denied them
injunctive relief.10  This decision reflects the alarming lack of protec-
tion for individual rights when they are compromised by spyware that
can literally see you.  The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act has been
used to deal with physical intrusions on computers,11 while the ECPA
prohibits certain types of access to stored communications and the
interception of electronic communications.12  However, courts have
struggled to apply these laws as technology has advanced.13
Even though the unknown usage of a personal webcam to take
pictures of individuals in their home or workplace is a grievous viola-
tion of personal privacy, it has not been satisfactorily addressed in
court or by legislation but rather merely noted with outrage in the
news.14  In this Note I discuss the dangers that spyware and the usage
of information through the Internet present to personal privacy, and I
review the ECPA, its application and interpretation by the courts, and
its shortcomings.  Part I gives the statutory background of the ECPA
and the judicial history of the interception of electronic communica-
8 Id. at *1.
9 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(4)–(5), 2520(a)–(b) (2012).
10 Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., C.A. No. 11-101, 2011 WL 2672204, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 8,
2011).
11 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2012).
12 See id. §§ 2510–22, 2701–12.
13 See, e.g., United States v. Councilman (Councilman II), 373 F.3d 197, 203–04 (1st
Cir. 2004), vacated, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The Wiretap Act’s purpose was, and con-
tinues to be, to protect the privacy of communications. . . . [M]uch of the protection may
have been eviscerated by the realities of modern technology. We observe, as most courts
have, that the language may be out of step with the technological realities of computer
crimes.”), reh’g  granted, opinion withdrawn, 385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004) (en banc), and on
reh’g, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868,
874 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We observe that until Congress brings the laws in line with modern
technology, protection of the Internet . . . will remain a confusing and uncertain area of
the law.”).
14 See, e.g., Kealan Oliver, Suit: Lower Merion School District Allegedly Spied on Students
Through Webcams, CBS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2010, 12:20 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
suit-lower-merion-school-district-allegedly-spied-on-students-through-webcams (“A federal
lawsuit filed by . . . a student at Harriton High and his parents, claims the school remotely
spied on their son at home through a webcam on a laptop the school had given him.”);
Matt Peckham, Rent-to-Own Outfit Allegedly Spied on PC Customers with Webcams, TIME (May 3,
2011), http://techland.time.com/2011/05/03/rent-to-own-outfit-allegedly-spied-on-pc-
customers-with-webcam (“Aaron’s Inc. may have . . . stepped all over its customers’ privacy
rights.” (emphasis omitted)).
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tions under the ECPA.  Part II analyzes the dangers that the Internet
has brought to individual privacy, recent case law dealing with ad-
vanced spyware technology, and the “WebcamGate” scandal.  Part III
emphasizes that Internet spyware and the usage of information over
the Internet is a serious threat to privacy, critically examines some
proposed amendments to the ECPA, and calls for legislative involve-
ment in protecting individual Internet privacy rights.  Ultimately, I
conclude that state law protection is not sufficient and that federal law
should protect privacy and the Internet as a form of interstate com-
merce.  In order to do so, the ECPA should be amended to include
protection of any information accessible on a computer while it is con-
nected to the Internet as “electronic communications.”
I
BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Background
1. The ECPA
Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in
order to update existing federal surveillance law, but most of its provi-
sions were enacted in 1986, before the existence of the public In-
ternet and its many avenues of communication: online chatting,
banking, video conferencing, and social media.15  However, it was en-
acted to deal with e-mail and the unauthorized interception of elec-
tronic communications.16  The ECPA is broken into three titles, which
are commonly referred to as the Wiretap Act,17 the Stored Communi-
cations Act,18 and the Pen Registry Act.19  The Pen Registry Act pro-
hibits any devices that record contact information such as phone
numbers or e-mail addresses20 and is not pertinent to privacy inva-
sions from keylogger spyware that can also capture screenshots and
webcam pictures.  The Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications
Act (SCA) have traditionally been used to monitor the unauthorized
access of electronic communications.21
15 See Charles H. Kennedy, An ECPA for the 21st Century: The Present Reform Efforts and
Beyond, 20 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 129, 129 (2011); Katherine A. Oyama, Note, E-Mail Pri-
vacy After United States v. Councilman: Legislative Options for Amending ECPA, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 499, 499 (2006).
16 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2–3, 8, 10–11 (1986).
17 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2012); Paul Koob, Comment, Not Enough Fingers in the Dam:
A Call for Federal Regulation of Keyloggers, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 125, 129 (2009).
18 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 (2012).
19 Id. §§ 3121–27.
20 See Koob, supra note 17, at 129. R
21 See, e.g., Oyama, supra note 15, at 499–500 (“[The] ECPA provides the statutory R
framework governing the interception of electronic communications under the Wiretap
Act and access to stored electronic communications under the SCA.” (footnote omitted)).
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The Wiretap Act provides that an individual shall be punished or
subject to suit if he or she “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to inter-
cept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication.”22  There are
four exceptions for the government or Internet service providers that
do not apply when an unauthorized third party makes an intrusion
through direct physical intervention or spyware.23  The Wiretap Act
defines an electronic communication as the “transfer of signs, signals,
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmit-
ted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelec-
tronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce.”24  Originally, there was a difference in the Act’s language
between the definition of a “wire communication” and an “electronic
communication” that created ambiguity as to how stored wire and
electronic communications fit into the statutory scheme.25  Congress
amended the definition of “wire communication” in order to clarify
that all stored communications were regulated by the SCA, not the
Wiretap Act.26
The Wiretap Act defines “intercept” as the “aural or other acquisi-
tion of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”27
There is no indication of when the communication can be inter-
cepted, but there is a clear difference between a communication while
it is being intercepted and a communication in storage,28 which will
be discussed in this Part.  The Wiretap Act allows aggrieved individuals
to sue for an injunction or to bring a civil action in court.29
The SCA broadly prohibits unauthorized access to stored commu-
nications.30  It is illegal if an individual “intentionally accesses without
authorization a facility through which an electronic communication
service is provided . . . [or] intentionally exceeds an authorization to
access that facility; and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized
22 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012).
23 See id. § 2510(12); United States v. Councilman (Councilman III), 418 F.3d 67, 72
(1st Cir. 2005) (discussing the government’s argument defining electronic communication
and noting that there are “four specific exceptions not relevant here”).
24 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012).
25 See Samantha L. Martin, Note, Interpreting the Wiretap Act: Applying Ordinary Rules of
“Transit” to the Internet Context, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 441, 451–52 (2006).
26 See USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); see also Oyama,
supra note 15, at 504 (“In 2001, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act and amended R
ECPA’s definition of ‘wire communication’ by moving the protection of stored voice com-
munications . . . from the Wiretap Act to the SCA.”).
27 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (2012).
28 See Martin, supra note 25, at 443 (discussing the difference between communica- R
tions “in transit” and “in storage”).
29 See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a)–(b) (2014).
30 See id. § 2701.
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access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic
storage in such system.”31  Programmers developed spyware devices,
generally classified as “keyloggers,” that are able to access and store
information on a computer; this type of access was not prohibited by
the Wiretap Act because it did not fall within the SCA’s specific provi-
sions on access.32  Additionally, the SCA’s exceptions are more con-
cerning than the ones detailed in the Wiretap Act because they offer
less protection to stored communications.33  There is an exception for
conduct authorized “by the person or entity providing a wire or elec-
tronic communications service,”34 which has enabled many Internet
providers to legally access personal information.  Many Internet ser-
vice providers of e-mail include a notification that consumers’ infor-
mation may be used while it is stored with them.35  It is subsequently
more difficult for consumers to protect their privacy rights under the
SCA.
2. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) will not be my fo-
cus, but it is important to briefly recognize its uses in protecting indi-
vidual privacy rights.  Although the CFAA does prohibit certain
individual actions, it requires a plaintiff to show a loss “aggregating at
least $5,000 in value.”36  This makes it incredibly difficult for plaintiffs
to receive damages for intrusions that may not have caused monetary
injury.  However, an individual who “intentionally accesses a computer
without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby ob-
tains” protected information can be subject to criminal action and
civil suit.37  Keylogger software can fall under this statute if it is ruled
as an “unauthorized access.”38
31 See id. § 2701(a)(1)–(2).
32 See, Koob, supra note 17, at 140–42 (“[A]n individual using a keylogging device R
cannot be held responsible for the act of installing and capturing key strokes under the
FWA [Wiretap Act], as there is no interception of ‘electronic communications’ under the
statute.”).
33 See Oyama, supra note 15, at 506–08 (“Overall, the SCA is considerably less strin- R
gent than the Wiretap Act.”).
34 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2012).
35 See, e.g., Derek S. Witte, Bleeding Data in a Pool of Sharks: The Anathema of Privacy in a
World of Digital Sharing and Electronic Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 717, 727 (2013) (giving exam-
ples of Facebook and Google privacy policies indicating that they may use certain con-
sumer information).
36 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2012).
37 Id. § 1030(a)(2).
38 See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Koob, supra
note 17, at 130–35 (elaborating applications of the CFAA that are relevant to “access”). R
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B. Judicial Interpretation of the Interception of
Communications Under the ECPA
1. The Contemporaneous Requirement for “Intercept” in the ECPA
As discussed previously, the Wiretap Act and the SCA exist to ad-
dress separate privacy issues, and communications must be “inter-
cepted” under the Wiretap Act in order for the statute to be
triggered.39  In determining whether the Wiretap Act should apply to
an action, courts will look at either the definition of “intercept” or the
definition of “electronic communication” in order to determine
whether or not the communication was intercepted.40  The definition
of “intercept” under the ECPA may suggest the capture of communi-
cations or the access of communications in storage.
Several circuits have explicitly addressed issues concerning the
Wiretap Act and the definition of “intercept.”41  In 1994, the Fifth Cir-
cuit faced the divide between the Wiretap Act and the SCA.42  The
Secret Service seized a computer belonging to Steve Jackson Games,
and then government personnel read e-mails that were stored on the
hard drive.43  The court determined that Congress had not intended
electronic communications in storage to be subject to interception
under the definition in the ECPA.44  This holding appeals to common
sense, which dictates that there has to be a difference between inter-
cepted communications and stored communications.  By placing a
real-time requirement on interception, the court stabilized the differ-
ence between the two types of data.  However, it also caused further
problems because of the amount of time that e-mail can take before it
arrives in its recipient’s inbox.  An e-mail can be temporarily stored
39 See supra Part I.A.1.
40 See, e.g., Koob, supra note 17, at 137 (“[T]he issue lies more in the definition of R
‘electronic communication’ than ‘intercept.’); Martin, supra note 25, at 454–55 (“Although R
courts have used . . . two different analyses, they have essentially been answering the same
question—whether the communication was in the process of transmission at the time of its
acquisition.”).
41 See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“Every circuit court to have considered the matter has held that an ‘intercept’ under the
ECPA must occur contemporaneously with transmission.”); United States v. Steiger, 318
F.3d 1039, 1048–49 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e hold that a contemporaneous interception—
i.e., an acquisition during ‘flight’—is required to implicate the Wiretap Act with respect to
electronic communications.”); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“[T]o be ‘intercepted’ in violation of the Wiretap Act, it must be acquired
during transmission, not while it is in electronic storage.”); Steve Jackson Games, Inc., v.
U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n intercept ‘require[s] participa-
tion by the one charged with an ‘interception’ in the contemporaneous acquisition of the
communication . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658 (5th Cir. 1976))).
42 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 458.
43 Id. at 459.
44 Id. at 461–62.
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but still be in transit to its destination.45  This prompted evaluation of
the second prong of the Wiretap Act, the definition of “electronic
communication.”
2. United States v. Councilman and “Electronic Communication”
While United States v. Councilman deals directly with e-mail privacy,
the court’s evaluation of the definition of “electronic communication”
deserves discussion here.46  The court in Councilman was forced to de-
termine whether access of e-mails while they were in temporary stor-
age was a violation of the Wiretap Act or the SCA.47  The court
ultimately concluded that an e-mail, during its transfer through the
Internet, is stored repeatedly.48  The court detailed the process of
transmission and stated that Congress did not intend to remove elec-
tronic communications from the scope of the Wiretap Act when they
are being temporarily stored.49  Therefore, the definition of “elec-
tronic communication” must include “transient” storage that is “in-
trinsic to the communication process.”50
This determination that access of transient storage is punishable
under the Wiretap Act brought to light the shortcomings of the provi-
sions of the ECPA.  Because of emerging technologies, some of the
definitions do not adequately describe the reality of information trans-
fer over the Internet.  This decision significantly altered conceptions
on the Wiretap Act and led to calls for the amendment of definitions
in the ECPA.51  It also led to an examination of keylogger software
that did not transmit immediately from a computer or did not trans-
mit information while the computer was connected to the Internet.
Does the gathering of this type of information violate the Wiretap Act?
3. United States v. Ropp and “Electronic Communication”
The definition of “electronic communication” was examined in
relation to a type of keylogger spyware in United States v. Ropp.52  The
keylogger used in this case recorded and stored keystrokes so that an
individual in possession of the device could access them later, thereby
45 See Martin, supra note 25, at 443. R
46 United States v. Councilman (Councilman II), 373 F.3d 197, 199–200 (1st Cir.
2004), reh’g en banc granted, opinion withdrawn, 385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004), and on reh’g en
banc, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
47 Id. at 203.
48 See United States v. Councilman (Councilman III), 418 F.3d 67, 69–79 (1st Cir.
2005).
49 See id.
50 Id. at 85.
51 See, e.g., Oyama, supra note 15, at 518 (arguing for a clearer definition of “inter- R
cept” under the ECPA).
52 See United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 831–32 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
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“eavesdropping” on an individual through a computer.53  The device
only operated within the confines of the computer, just like the inter-
ception that occurred in Councilman.54  However, Councilman involved
e-mail transmitted between computers,55 whereas the intercepted
keystrokes in Ropp were transmitted within the computer.56  The sys-
tem of transmission does not affect interstate commerce, and the keys-
trokes that were intercepted were in preparation for an electronic
communication, not a communication itself.57
This definition of electronic communication ensured that a trans-
mission is within a network, not simply within a system.  Simple typing
on a computer is not a communication because the action of keys-
trokes does not create a communication unless the keystrokes are go-
ing beyond the computer.  Keyloggers such as these may be attacked
by the SCA or the CFAA, but courts have held that they are not illegal
under the Wiretap Act, leaving a loophole in the ECPA that com-
promises personal privacy.58
II
ANALYSIS
A. Increasing Risks to Personal Privacy
1. The Right to Information Privacy
The right to privacy, and especially the right to privacy of infor-
mation, is sometimes assumed in today’s world because of the
Supreme Court’s decision that everyone has a right to privacy.59  The
specific right to information privacy can be defined as the right an
individual has to control how his or her personal information is “ac-
quired, disclosed, and used.”60  The Clinton Administration had an
Information Infrastructure Task Force, which defined personal infor-
mation as “information identifiable to the individual.”61  The govern-
ment also stated that “an individual’s reasonable expectation of
53 See id.
54 See id. at 837.
55 Councilman III, 418 F.3d at 69–72.
56 See Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 837.
57 See id. at 837–38.
58 See, e.g., id. (acknowledging the loophole created in holding that a keylogger did
not violate the Wiretap Act).
59 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
60 Henry M. Cooper, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Does the Answer to the
Internet Information Privacy Problem Lie in a Fifteen-Year-Old Federal Statute? A Detailed Analysis,
20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 3 (2001) (quoting Jerry Kang, Information Privacy
in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1205 (1998)).
61 See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\100-5\CRN504.txt unknown Seq: 10 12-JUN-15 11:00
1200 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1191
privacy regarding access to and use of his or her personal information
should be assured.”62
However, there is concern as to retaining the right to information
privacy.  In a recent article, Derek S. Witte asserts that we are “bleed-
ing” data and that it is “necessary to insist on a right to protect oneself
from the discovery of private information.”63  He claims that the cur-
rent federal laws do not create a comprehensive right to privacy, com-
paring the numerous federal privacy statutes and their application to
information, the Internet, and the individuals regulated.64  Many of
the privacy laws are not aimed toward individual privacy rights but are
instead focused on protecting individuals from the government and
corporate privacy.65  The most danger to personal privacy results from
corporations that have license to invade on personal privacy, corpora-
tions such as Facebook or Google.66  Now, corporations like Aaron’s
are capable of using software to spy on their customers.67  This
spyware is readily available and legal in today’s market; what is
preventing other corporations like Dell, Apple, or Hewlett-Packard
from doing the same?  There are multiple loopholes in the ECPA that
allow for intrusions such as information gathering, as well as the use
of keyloggers to obtain keystrokes, screenshots, and webcam pictures.
2. Loopholes in the ECPA
There are multiple loopholes in the ECPA that have been noted
and criticized since the advent of the Internet and advanced spyware.
The first major issue is that the definitions of “intercept” and “elec-
tronic communication” are still ambiguous, forcing courts to note that
this area of the law is uncertain.68  Samantha L. Martin argues that the
real world precedent of “transit” should apply to electronic
62 Christine A. Varney, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Privacy and American
Business Conference: Privacy in the Electronic Age *2 (Nov. 1, 1995), 1995 WL 643418
(F.T.C.).
63 See Witte, supra note 35, at 741. R
64 See id. at 742–47 (detailing in chart form the different statutes, who they regulate,
what type of information they protect, whether they are applicable to Facebook and
Google, and any exceptions to their general rules).
65 See Allard, supra note 6, at 62 (“To date, many if not most of the so-called cyberlaw R
privacy bills deal with either corporate intellectual property or security, or protection of
government functions, as opposed to individuals’ rights and liberties.  Curiously, there is
not yet a powerful, vocal constituency for the protection of individual privacy in the United
States.”).
66 See Witte, supra note 35, at 748. R
67 See Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., C.A. No. 11-101, 2011 WL 2672009, at *4 (W.D. Pa. June
16, 2011) report and recommendation adopted sub nom, Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., C.A. No. 11-101,
2011 WL 2672204 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2011).
68 See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“[U]ntil Congress brings the laws in line with modern technology, protection of the In-
ternet and websites such as Konop’s will remain a confusing and uncertain area of the
law.”); Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994)
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communications as they did in Councilman.69  She argues that the defi-
nition of “intercept” should also include any contemporaneous acqui-
sitions while e-mails are in temporary storage.70
E-mail is the least protected when it is in electronic storage, after
it is delivered to a recipient.71  Upon close examination, there are sev-
eral exceptions to the SCA that cause issues for both electronic com-
munications and e-mail in storage.  For instance, if a service provider
of electronic communication has stored information for over 180
days, the government can require the provider to disclose the infor-
mation without notice to the customer.72  This loophole has caused
some stir in the media, but has not been addressed by the legislature
recently.73  This affords lesser protection to electronic communication
than private letters because the government does not need a
warrant.74
Another pertinent issue is the exception granted to Internet ser-
vice providers.75  Internet service providers have immunity from un-
lawful activity such as surveying e-mail simply because they provide the
service.76  It appears as though there is an industry standard that al-
lows Internet service providers such as MSN, Google, AOL, and AT&T
to read their customer’s e-mail.77  After Katherine A. Oyama com-
pared these policies in 2006,78 not much has changed with Apple,
Google, and Facebook policies today.79  These providers also have
(“[T]he Wiretap Act . . . is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity . . . .” (citation
omitted)).
69 See Martin, supra note 25, at 469–74 (“[E]lectronic communications in temporary R
electronic storage are ‘in transit’ when the storage is incidental to their transfer.”).
70 See id.
71 See Cooper, supra note 60, at 17 (“However, ECPA Title II, in its current form, R
would not adequately protect an individual’s personal information that was transmitted via
the Internet and subsequently electronically stored in an electronic record on an e-com-
merce entity’s server from being disclosed to the private sector.”).
72 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2014); see also Cooper, supra note 60, at 13 (discussing the R
provisions of section 2703(a)).
73 See, e.g., Erin Fuchs, No One is Talking About the Insane Law That Lets Authorities Read
Any Email over 180 Days Old, BUS. INSIDER (June 7, 2013, 3:53 PM), http://www.businessin
sider.com/when-can-the-government-read-your-email-2013-6; Ryan J. Reilly, DOJ: Electronic
Communications Privacy Act’s 180-Day Stored Email Rule Not ‘Principled,’ HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 19, 2013, 11:33 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ryan-j-reilly/ecpa-180-day-
email-rule_b_2907846.html.
74 See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) .
75 See id. § 2701(c)(1).
76 See Oyama, supra note 15, at 519. R
77 See id. at 520–22 (describing the industry standard that evolved from the privacy
policies of major Internet service providers such as MSN, EarthLink, AT&T, Google, and
AOL).
78 See id. at 520–22 nn.152–56 & 158 (quoting the privacy policies of these Internet
service providers).
79 See Witte, supra note 35, at 722 (“Today, individuals commonly share data about R
themselves through the various services and applications of social networking and Internet
productivity sites, like Facebook and Google.”).
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access to our whereabouts through software on our computers and on
our mobile phones.80  Courts and commentators have noted that
there is a significant lack of clarification in the ECPA about the pro-
tection of geolocation data, because Congress did not anticipate this
type of information or that it could be used by the government im-
properly.81  Furthermore, information on what websites we visit, what
we search, and our names, addresses, and e-mails can all be stored and
recorded without our knowledge, sometimes even including pass-
words, credit card information, and Social Security numbers.82  If all
this information is accessible to the public, what prevents corporations
such as data mining brokers and Internet service providers from inter-
cepting communications directly from our computers?  Isn’t the use
of software through the Internet to intercept keystrokes or webcam
pictures similar to the gathering of personal information that happens
every time we go online?
Some argue that the line should be drawn at keylogger
software.83  Paul Koob discusses the dangers of keylogger software at
length, including the loophole in the ECPA that allows some keylog-
ger software to slip through the clutches of regulation.84  Some key-
logger software intercepts keystrokes, like the software in Ropp, and
does not transfer the information, preventing individuals from bring-
ing suit under the Wiretap Act.85  Koob also argues that these types of
80 See id. at 734–35. (describing how mobile service providers can track customers’
locations and store that data even when customers do not grant permission).
81 See, e.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of
Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010) (re-
manding to protect “citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy regarding their physical
movements and locations” with a warrant); Kennedy, supra note 15 at 147–48 (“Congress R
did not anticipate in 1986 that mobile telephone geolocation data would become a target
of governmental surveillance, and ECPA sets no standard for governmental access to that
data.”).
82 See, e.g., Witte, supra note 35, at 731 (“Even when we believe we are anonymously R
visiting web sites, data-mining companies, curious corporations, and the web sites them-
selves use tracking methods, cookies, and legal spyware to watch and store information
about what we do on the Internet.”); Taylor Armerding, Data Brokers’ Collection of Internet
Activity Data Raises Privacy Issues, IDG NEWS SERVICE (Nov. 7, 2013, 8:40 PM), http://
news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=0BA3C6AC-0925-23E5-A930D89890D4D90F (“[Big Data] com-
panies . . . collect and sell information to marketers on everything from your marital status,
whether you might be pregnant or have a newborn, have cancer, are trying to lose weight,
are gay or straight, how much you make, what credit cards you use, your lines of credit,
where you live, what your house cost, what kind of car you drive or if you might be looking
to buy a new one, your race, occupation, political leanings, education level, have one or
more children in college, have pets to what your hobbies are and more . . . .”).
83 See, e.g., Koob, supra note 17, at 128 (“Congress has struggled with the issue of R
keylogging devices and software.”).
84 See id. at 137–40.
85 See id. at 137–38 (stating that information captured from a keyboard is not an “elec-
tronic communication” and so interception of it does not violate the Wiretap Act); Patricia
L. Bellia, Spyware and the Limits of Surveillance Law, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1283, 1301–05
(detailing the “‘interception’ problem”).
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keyloggers cannot be caught under the SCA because the access would
not be password protected on the computer and therefore would not
be an illegal access to the computer information.86  Koob calls for ei-
ther a new statute to deal with keylogger software or an amendment to
the definition of “electronic communication” so that a transfer is no
longer necessary while gathering information.87  However, this would
make some of the legal, useful information illegal, and could cause
serious problems in social media.  Moreover, most keylogger software
has evolved and now works remotely through the Internet, such as the
DesignerWare software used by Aaron’s franchisees.88  This type of al-
teration would not protect information stolen by the more accessible
and invasive keylogger software of today, because even if the informa-
tion is “transferred” over the Internet, the software is taking screen-
shots, pictures, and keystrokes that do not fit into the conventional
definition of “electronic communication.”89  In order to deal with the
increased danger that the Internet has presented to today’s privacy
rights, the current judicial interpretation of the ECPA for keylogger
software must be analyzed.
B. Evolving Keylogger Technology and Case Law
1. United States v. Barrington
Keylogging technology has evolved since the decision of United
States v. Ropp, which involved a KeyKatcher device that captured physi-
cal impulses on the cable between a keyboard and a computer.90
While keyloggers used to be physical, they are now digital and in-
stalled as software on computers.91  The most recent circuit case in-
volving modern keylogging software is United States v. Barrington,
which demonstrates the court’s unwillingness to adapt the ECPA to a
86 See Koob, supra note 17, at 140 (“Because this information is not password pro- R
tected, accessing it would not be unauthorized, and therefore lawful under the SCA.”).
87 See id. at 150.
88 See In re Aaron’s, Inc., File No. 122-3264, 2013 WL 5835421, at *2 (F.T.C. Oct. 22,
2013).
89 Under current case law like Ropp, keystrokes are not considered a transfer; how-
ever, they might be if someone is entering them into an Internet browser. See United
States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 837–38 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that keylogging
transmissions did not constitute “electronic communication[s]” because the transmissions
did not involve use of “the internet or any other external network”).  Screenshots and
pictures from webcams are not “electronic communications” because they are taken by a
direct action of the keylogger software, not as part of a transmitted signal. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(12) (2014) (defining “electronic communication” as requiring a “transfer . . . by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system”).
90 See Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
91 See United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1184 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011) (recogniz-
ing that keylogging is now “accomplished through use of a dedicated software
application”).
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change in technology.92  In this case, two college students who wanted
to change their grades and the grades of friends that were applying to
graduate school concocted a plan to access the Florida A&M Univer-
sity system with the usage of a keylogger.93  The students managed to
install the keylogger software onto several university computers,
thereby capturing the login information and passwords of several uni-
versity employees, and transmitted the information through e-mail to
the students.94  This information was used to access the grading sys-
tem at the university and change the grades of certain students.95
The court reviewed the usage of the keylogger software and
stated that in order for a violation of the Wiretap Act to occur, the
interception of an electronic communication must be contemporane-
ous, reaffirming the conventional definition.96  The court stated:
Conceivably, the keylogger software at issue here could be used
to contemporaneously capture information or signals being trans-
mitted beyond the user’s computer.  If so, this would bring the key-
logger software within the definition of a scanning receiver as ‘a
device or apparatus that can be used to intercept a wire or elec-
tronic communication in violation of [the Wiretap Act].’  However,
the Government points to no evidence in the record showing that
the keylogger at issue here had that capacity and we have found
none.97
This holding indicates that the court was unwilling to explore the im-
pact of advanced technology on the interpretation of the Wiretap Act
portion of the ECPA.  Even though the keylogger was intercepting in-
formation being entered into the computer while it was connected to
the Internet and transmitting that information through the Internet
by e-mail, the court decided that this type of interception is not con-
temporaneous.98  This demonstrates the lack of protection that the
ECPA grants to consumer information when interpreted by the
courts.  However, district courts have begun to tackle this issue and
have started to tentatively steer the interpretation of the ECPA in the
opposite direction.99
92 See id. at 1202–03.
93 Id. at 1184.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 See id. at 1202 (citing United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1048–49 (11th Cir.
2003)). “Accordingly, use of a keylogger will not violate the Wiretap Act if the signal or
information captured from the keystrokes is not at that time being transmitted beyond the
computer on which the keylogger is installed (or being otherwise transmitted by a system
that affects interstate commerce.” Id.
97 Id. at 1203 (quoting 18 § U.S.C. 1029(e)(8)).
98 See id. at 1202–03.
99 See, e.g., Luis v. Zang, No. 1:11-cv-884, 2013 WL 811816, at *6–7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5,
2013) (citing Klumb v. Goan, 884 F. Supp. 2d 644, 661 (E.D. Tenn. 2012)) (“[S]pyware can
violate the Wiretap Act if it transmits captured or recorded information over the
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2. District Court Decisions
Several district courts have faced complaints involving new key-
logging spyware software such as SpectorPro, PC Rental Agent, and
WebWatcher.100  These keyloggers are digital spyware that challenge
the conventional definition of “contemporaneous interception” and
more or less work the same way, including taking screenshots, record-
ing keystrokes, and activating the webcam of a computer.101  In one
case, Luis v. Zang, an individual used the software WebWatcher to spy
on his wife.102  This software allowed him to access screenshots and
keystrokes from her computer, as well as other information.103  The
court examined previous cases, such as Barrington and Ropp and deter-
mined that the keylogger software used in Ropp was markedly different
than WebWatcher because it did not transmit information away from
the computer, and that the court in Barrington acknowledged that key-
logger software could satisfy the contemporaneous interception re-
quirement.104  The court suggested that a rethinking of the definition
of “contemporaneous” might be necessary and that the timing of the
intercepted data’s transmission should be irrelevant, allowing the
ECPA to be applied.105  However, this rethinking of the definition
may start to blur the line between the ECPA and the Stored Commu-
[I]nternet . . . .”); Arrington v. Colortyme, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 2d 733, 747 (W.D. Pa. 2013)
(“Because the Complaint’s allegations regarding Plaintiff’s private communications are suf-
ficient to plead the occurrence of an ‘intercept’ under the ECPA, the federal cause of
action survives, regardless of whether the screenshots, keystrokes and webcam photographs
were in transmission.  Furthermore, given the sophistication of the technology at issue, it is
entirely possible that discovery will reveal that the screenshots, keystrokes and pictures
were in some state of ‘transmission’ as envisaged by the statute when they were obtained by
PC Rental Agent.”); Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-1104, 2012 WL 4049484, at *9 (C.D. Ill.
Sept. 13, 2012) (“There are not many cases analyzing the application of the ECPA to
screen-capture technology.  In light of the other ECPA precedent discussed in this Order,
though, the Court must find that Defendants’ use of SpectorPro constituted an intercep-
tion under the ECPA.”).
100 See Luis, 2013 WL 811816, at *1 (discussing WebWatcher); Arrington, 972 F. Supp.
2d at 737 (discussing PC Rental Agent); Shefts, 2012 WL 4049484, at *3 (discussing
SpectorPro).
101 See Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., CA No. 11-101, 2011 WL 2672009, at *5 (W.D. Pa. June 16,
2011) report and recommendation adopted sub nom, Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., No. 11-101, 2011 WL
2672204 (W.D. Pa. July 8, 2011) (explaining that an employee oversaw the keystrokes,
screenshots, and photographs that the PC Rental Agent software collected); SpectorPro Prod-
uct Overview, SPECTORSOFT, http://www.spectorsoft.com/products/SpectorPro_Windows/
index.asp (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (listing screenshots, keystrokes, and remote viewing
among its monitoring capabilities); WebWatcher–Features, WEBWATCHER, http://
www.webwatcher.com/#features (last visited Apr. 19, 2015) (detailing how the software can
record keystrokes and screenshots, but unclear as to whether or not the software has web-
cam access).
102 Luis, 2013 WL 811816, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 2013).
103 See id. at *6.
104 See id. at *5–6.
105 See id. at *6–7 (citing Klumb v. Goan, 884 F. Supp. 2d 644, 661) (E.D. Tenn.
2012)).
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nications Act, bringing back the problem presented in United States v.
Councilman of what is stored and what is a transmission.106
Another court in the Western District of Pennsylvania dealt with
the argument that the information obtained from the PC Rental
Agent software was not in transmission when it was accessed.107  The
court stated that in light of the technology’s sophistication, it is possi-
ble that the information was in “transmission” as defined by the stat-
ute, and that the plaintiff had a claim that should not be dismissed.108
A third court in the Central District of Illinois took this reasoning fur-
ther, ruling that the usage of a similar spyware called SpectorPro was
in violation of the ECPA.109  The court in Shefts v. Petrakis stated:
Plaintiff puts on undisputed evidence that the SpectorPro software
caused images of Plaintiff’s computer activity, including his commu-
nications via his Yahoo! email account, to be simultaneously cap-
tured by SpectorPro. . . .  [A]ny emails sent by Plaintiff on his
Yahoo! account via his desktop computer would have been captured
by SpectorPro as they were transmitted to Yahoo! via the internet.
Therefore, SpectorPro contemporaneously captured Plaintiff’s elec-
tronic communications within the meaning of the ECPA, and De-
fendants were able, if they were at the monitoring station while
Plaintiff was using his Yahoo! email account, to view Plaintiff’s com-
munications as he viewed them.110
This clearly indicates that this court was willing to accept that modern
keylogger spyware is able to intercept information from a computer
contemporaneously when the information is being transferred over
the Internet.  However, this ruling is very narrow, as it does not ad-
dress screenshots taken of Microsoft Word documents or other infor-
mation entered into a computer but not directly through the Internet.
It also does not address the issue of webcam pictures.  While courts
could eventually construe the ECPA to include information directly
entered into an Internet browser as the court in Shefts v. Petrakis did,
this still leaves any other computer activity and unwanted webcam pic-
tures outside the statute’s protection.  Only one court has publicly
faced the webcam issue: the court in the case of Robbins v. Lower Mer-
ion School District.111
106 See supra Part I.B.2.
107 See Arrington v. Colortyme, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 2d 733, 747 (W.D. Pa. 2013).
108 See id.
109 See Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-1104, 2012 WL 4049484, at *11 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 13,
2012).
110 Id. at *9.
111 No. 10-665, 2010 WL 1957103, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2010) (enjoining school
district from remotely activating webcams on student laptops).
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C. Robbins v. Lower Merion School District
1. Court Grants Injunctions
In February 2010, a group of students and parents sued the
Lower Merion School District in a class action lawsuit, outraged by the
discovery that the school district had been taking videos and photo-
graphs of students by utilizing software called Lan Rev.112  The school
district had launched an initiative that allowed every child to receive a
laptop in order to have 24/7 access to resources and school related
activities.113  Parents and students did not know that the school dis-
trict could remotely activate the webcams until an assistant principal
at a high school informed Blake Robbins that she believed that he had
engaged in improper behavior in his home, and she used a photo that
was clearly from Blake’s webcam as evidence.114
The first charge that the plaintiffs brought against the Lower
Merion School District was one under the ECPA.115  The plaintiffs
brought a claim under section 2511 and section 2520 of the ECPA,
claiming that the school district had illegally intercepted electronic
communications.116  The ECPA section 2511 states:
[A]ny person who—(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to inter-
cept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to in-
tercept, any . . . electronic communication . . . [or] (d) intentionally
uses, or endeavors to use, the contents of any . . . electronic commu-
nication, knowing or having reason to know that the information
was obtained through the interception of a[n] . . . electronic com-
munication in violation of this subsection . . . shall be pun-
ished . . . or shall be subject to suit . . . .117
The ECPA section 2520 explains the relief that is available to plaintiffs
who sue for a violation of the Act, which could include preliminary or
declaratory relief, damages, punitive damages, and litigation costs.118
The second charge brought by the plaintiffs was under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act section 1030.119  This statute forbids the unau-
thorized access of a computer and prohibits taking information from
a protected computer, but it is challenging to pursue damages under
112 See Robbins ex rel. Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-665, 2010 WL
3421026, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010).
113 See Class Action Complaint at 6, Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 2010 WL
581793 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010).
114 See id.
115 See id. at 7–9 (“The software/hardware used by the School District to remotely acti-
vate the webcams complained of constitute an ‘electronic . . . device’ within the meaning
of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5).  By using said software/hardware to secretly obtain webcam images,
each Defendant ‘intercepts’ that communication within the meaning of § 2511.”).
116 See id.
117 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012); see supra Part I.A.1.
118 See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2012); supra Part I.A.1.
119 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 113, at 10–11.
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this statute because the relief is narrower than that of the ECPA.120
The plaintiffs also brought claims under the Stored Communications
Act, the Civil Rights Act, the Fourth Amendment, and state law.121
The court issued a series of preliminary injunctions against the
school district’s further usage of the spyware.122  The court stated that
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this paragraph, [the school dis-
trict] is enjoined from purchasing any software, hardware, or other
technology that allows for the remote activation of webcams on stu-
dent laptops or the remote monitoring or recording of audio or video
from student laptops.”123  However, the court did not explain its rea-
soning in any of its three official orders.124  The court also did not
explain its reasoning in a written opinion because the case settled well
before trial.125  Therefore, even though the court granted injunctions,
it is unclear what law and charges the court depended on.  Further-
more, because the case settled, the law—or lack of laws—concerning
this type of invasion of privacy was not addressed, and the court was
not able to present the legal community with a precedent.  However,
the case did spark outrage in the media and a proposed amendment.
2. “WebcamGate”
Although consumers appear to turn a blind eye to the usage of
geolocation information, web browsing, and data mining for targeted
advertising,126 the media outrage sparked by this intrusion of privacy
was anything but blind and forgiving.  Local news and national media
outlets reported on the story, which led to a federal investigation into
wiretap laws.127  One source indicated that the students at Harrington
High School where this drama unfolded had nicknamed the situation
120 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030; supra Part I.A.2.
121 See Class Action Complaint, supra note 113, at 11–15.
122 See Robbins ex rel. Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-665, 2010 WL
3421026, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010).
123 Robbins ex rel. Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-665, 2010 WL 1976869
(E.D. Pa. May 14, 2010).
124 See id. at *1–3; Robbins ex rel. Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-665, 2010
WL 3421026, at *1–8; Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 10-665, 2010 WL 1957103,
at *1–2.
125 See Adam B, WebcamGate Has Settled: $610,000, DAILY KOS (Oct. 12, 2010, 7:53 AM)
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2010/10/12/909702/-WebcamGate-Has-Settled-610-000.
126 See supra Part II.A.2.
127 See, e.g., Jennifer Abel, Webcamgate case resolved.  Badly, GUARDIAN (Oct. 16, 2010,
8:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/oct/16/little-
merion-webcamgate (criticizing the settlement of the case between the school district and
the students); Larry King, Dan Hardy & John Shiffman, Webcam Issue Is New Frontier: Cyber-
spying Suit Is Unprecedented, Experts Say.  A Federal Probe Is Said to Focus on Wiretap Laws.,
INQUIRER (Feb. 21, 2010), http://articles.philly.com/2010-02-21/news/25218818_1_wire-
tap-school-issued-laptop-spy (discussing the lawsuit filed against the Lower Merion School
District and the public’s response); Vince Lattanzio, WebcamGate Teen: “I Hope They’re Not
Watching Me,” NBC PHILA. (Feb. 22, 2010, 8:59 AM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/
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“WebcamGate,” and that school officials had originally installed the
software in order to track and retrieve stolen laptops.128  Unfortu-
nately, software that can be very useful for retrieving stolen goods can
also be used for other purposes; in this case, Blake Robbins’ webcam
was turned on and recorded him eating a couple of Mike and Ike
candies, leading school officials to somehow believe that he was in-
volved in drugs.129  Senator Arlen Specter held a Senate hearing inves-
tigating this matter in order to determine whether or not federal
legislation was needed to protect individuals, especially minors, from
webcam surveillance.130  One group that testified at the hearing, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation, reported that they strongly urged the
Senator to push for new protections against video surveillance, espe-
cially because the gap in the law on video surveillance had been
known to exist since at least 1984.131  Several media outlets reported
on the WebcamGate settlement, highlighting the lack of ramifications
for the district even in light of changes in policy, including the fact
that the administrators that were in charge of the software were able
to keep their jobs.132  Senator Specter introduced the Surreptitious
Video Surveillance Act of 2010 because of the continued lack of pro-
tection against webcam spying.133
As courts noted in cases such as Barrington and Shefts v. Petrakis,
technology has changed significantly since Congress passed the ECPA
news/local/WebcamGate-Teen-I-Hope-Theyre-Not-Watching-Me-84826357.html (review-
ing the case against the school district and discussing the reaction of the students).
128 See King, Hardy & Shiffman, supra note 127 (“The . . . school district said the cam- R
eras were activated only on laptops that had been reported missing, lost or stolen.  This
school year, technicians activated the system 42 times and retrieved 18 missing or stolen
laptops - before last week’s controversy caused officials to disable the system till further
notice.”).
129 See Lattanzio, supra note 127. R
130 See Vince Lattanzio, Specter Holding Hearing on WebcamGate Case, NBC PHILA. (Mar.
16, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/tech/Specter-Holding-
Hearing-on-WebcamGate-Case-87955817.html.
131 See Kevin Bankston, Senators Introduce Bill in Response to EFF’s Call for New Protections
Against Secret Video Surveillance, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 15 2010), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/senators-introduce-bill-response-effs-call-new (“Of course
it is anomalous to have detailed statutory regulation of bugging and wiretapping but not of
television surveillance, in Title III . . . and we would think it a very good thing if Congress
responded to the issues discussed in this opinion by amending Title III to bring television
surveillance within its scope.” (quoting United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir.
1984))).
132 See, e.g., Abel, supra note 127 (“So what happened to the school administrators . . .
who spied on teens at home, then lied about the extent of it?  Nothing.  No jobs lost and
no financial consequences, either . . . .”); Dan Stamm, School District Settles WebcamGate, NBC
PHILA. (Oct. 12, 2010, 8:48 AM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/breaking/
Lower-Merion-Webcam-Settlement-104746984.html (“Earlier this summer, the U.S. Attor-
ney’s Office, the FBI and the Montgomery County District Attorney cleared the District,
and its employees—current and former—of any criminal wrongdoing.”).
133 See Surreptitious Video Surveillance Act of 2010, S. 3214, 111th Cong. (2010);
Bankston, supra note 131. R
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and other communication privacy laws.134  This proposed legislation
by Senator Specter was not enacted as law, and there have been other
proposed amendments and laws that concern electronic communica-
tion privacy that have also been unsuccessful.135  As evidenced by the
alarming WebcamGate scandal that demonstrates the lack of legal
protection consumers have, it is clear that the ECPA and the CFAA
are outdated and have left courts in a difficult position; only recently
have courts begun to attempt to fit spyware into the current definition
of the ECPA.136  In order to protect consumers from spyware that is
capable of obtaining any and all information from a computer, from
keystrokes to pictures of the user, the legislative branch must take ac-
tion.  Failed legislation must be examined to determine how best to
proceed against this problem, which is becoming more and more rele-
vant in society today, as shown by the public’s reaction to Edward
Snowden.137
III
RECOMMENDATION FOR GREATER LEGISLATIVE ACTION
It is clear that the ECPA needs to protect a greater range of data
than it already does.  I propose that the definition of “electronic com-
munication” be altered to include “all information accessible to a
computer while it is connected to the Internet.”  While a computer is
connected to the Internet, all of the information on the computer has
the possibility of being accessed.  From Microsoft Word documents to
webcam pictures, anything a computer has access to should be consid-
ered an “electronic communication” when the Internet is involved.
This would prevent keylogger spyware from obtaining any informa-
tion on a computer illegally, and it would prevent a keylogger from
using a webcam, because as soon as the webcam turns on, the informa-
tion obtained by it becomes an electronic communication transmitted
by the computer.  This type of reform would allow Congress to impose
regulations on actions taken by individuals obtaining information illic-
itly and invading the privacy of consumers.  The usage of information
obtained through the Internet, such as Web history, could fall under-
neath this act, if Congress so desired.  That would cause problems for
134 See supra Part II.B.1–2.
135 See Surreptitious Video Surveillance Act of 2010; Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Preven-
tion Act of 2007, H.R. 1525, 110th Cong. (2007); Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber
Trespass Act, H.R. 964, 110th Cong. (2007); E-mail Privacy Act of 2005, S. 936, 109th Cong.
(2005).
136 See supra Part II.B.2.
137 See Edward Snowden: Timeline, BBC NEWS (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-us-canada-23768248 (describing the timeline of events involving Edward
Snowden leaking intelligence information and disclosing the existence of certain U.S. gov-
ernment surveillance programs).
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targeted advertising and the usage of geolocation data, but those
problems could easily be addressed by the courts or if Congress wishes
to add exceptions that detail how information obtained through the
Internet can be used.
Other solutions have been offered in the past, but as I will
demonstrate, these solutions will fall short, and Congress has failed to
pass legislation that is overly broad.  This simple definition change
would allow Congress to make a change in the current legislative land-
scape without drastically altering enforcement and expectations.  An
alternative to legislative action lies with the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, which has brought consumer suits against companies that use
invasive technology in the past.138  The Federal Trade Commission
has settled such disputes, much like how litigants have chosen to settle
with the defendants in cases that involved invasive technology such as
PC Rental Agent.139  Settlements are less expensive and less time con-
suming, so it stands to reason that many plaintiffs will choose this
route, leaving the judicial and legislative landscape relatively un-
touched for future unhappy explorers.  Instead of relying on govern-
ment enforcement through the FTC, Congress must act through
legislation by changing the definition of “electronic communication.”
Prior proposed legislation has not been successful thus far.
A. Proposed Legislation
It is clear that Congress is not blind to the fact that there is a need
for legislation involving electronic communication privacy, especially
legislation that addresses the problems that occur with the use of the
Internet.  Over the last decade, multiple bills have been submitted
and rejected, a few of which include the Surreptitious Video Surveil-
lance Act of 2010, the E-mail Privacy Act of 2005, the I-Spy Act, and
the Spy Act.140  The Surreptitious Video Surveillance Act of 2010, in-
troduced by Senator Arlen Specter after the WebcamGate scandal,
moves to make unauthorized video surveillance a criminal offense
when the individual is in a place that is not easily observable and has a
138 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Halts Computer Spying (Sept. 25,
2012), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/09/ftc-halts-computer-spying;
see also Complaint at *5, In re Aaron’s, Inc., File No. 122-3264, 2013 WL 5835421 (F.T.C.
Oct. 22, 2013) (stating that Aaron’s practices constituted unfair acts in violation of section
5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C § 45(a)).
139 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Aaron’s Rent-To-Own Chain Settles FTC
Charges That it Enabled Computer Spying by Franchisees (Oct. 22, 2013), http://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/10/aarons-rent-own-chain-settles-ftc-
charges-it-enabled-computer.
140 Surreptitious Video Surveillance Act of 2010, S. 3214, 111th Cong. (2010); Internet
Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1525, 110th Cong. (2007); Securely Protect
Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 964, 110th Cong. (2007); E-mail Privacy Act of
2005, S. 936, 109th Cong. (2005).
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reasonable expectation of privacy.141  Although there is no public rea-
son for the denial of this bill, this type of criminalization would be
difficult to enforce and may cause certain activities that should be le-
gal to become illegal, such as video surveillance for purposes of theft
protection.  This bill did not address the ECPA or the CFAA, which
were the statutes utilized by the plaintiffs in the WebcamGate scan-
dal.142  This type of legislation appears to be too broad and does not
address the issue of spyware that can access any information on a com-
puter, whether or not that information is being transmitted through
the Internet.
Another option presented was the E-Mail Privacy Act of 2005.143
This act moved to deal with the problems presented by United States v.
Councilman and the nature of e-mail transmission.144  Because the
Wiretap Act has more stringent requirements than the Stored Com-
munications Act, this amendment proposed to include the intercep-
tion of e-mails in storage as an interception of an electronic
communication.145  The proposed change to the Wiretap Act was as
follows:
Section 2510(4) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
striking “through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other
device.” and inserting “contemporaneous with transit, or on an
ongoing basis during transit, through the use of any electronic,
mechanical, or other device or process, notwithstanding that the
communication may simultaneously be in electronic storage[.]”146
While this definition would remove the problem presented by stored
e-mail, and perhaps could allow protection for stored information on
a computer that is not necessarily transmitted over the Internet, this
change would blur the line between the Wiretap Act and the SCA.
The legislature specifically divided electronic communications and
their storage into two separate regulations,147 so this monumental
141 See S. 3214 (“To prohibit any person from engaging in certain video surveillance
except under the same conditions authorized under chapter 119 of title 18, United States
Code, or as authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.”).
142 See Class Action Complaint at 9–10, Robbins v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 2010 WL
581793 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010).
143 See S. 936.
144 See supra Part I.B.2.
145 See Martin, supra note 25, at 476 (“If law enforcement is required to meet the Wire- R
tap Act’s rigorous requirements for obtaining electronic communications in transient elec-
tronic storage, law enforcement may end up using methods such as ‘sniffer devices’ less
often (since they may be unable to meet the Wiretap Act requirements) and therefore will
impose on individual liberties less often.”).
146 S. 936.
147 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2012) (regulating the interception of “electronic com-
munication”); 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012) (regulating the unauthorized access of a “facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided” and the obtaining or
altering of a communication while it is in storage).
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change would have to be carefully examined.  Furthermore, this
change in the definition will not solve the identified problems (web-
cam surveillance, information stored on a computer obtained through
keystrokes or screenshots, improper usage of data retrieved from the
Internet) but will simply reorganize the law currently in place.  Even if
stored information is included in an electronic communication, web-
cam surveillance may not be considered an interception of an elec-
tronic communication and information that is not stored through the
Internet may fall outside this definition.  While this amendment
would offer greater protection for information electronically trans-
ferred through the Internet, it does not address all of the problems
the Internet presents to privacy.
It is also important to note the existence of the I-Spy and the Spy
Act, neither of which passed in the Senate.148  The I-Spy Act probably
did not pass because it was an amendment to the CFAA that did not
have a private right of action.149  The I-Spy Act also did not address
physical keylogger issues, which the CFAA is meant to address.150  The
Spy Act proposed an entirely new act that would enforce the “prohibi-
tion of unfair or deceptive acts or practices relating to spyware.”151
While this act did provide sufficient redress for private plaintiffs,152
the law’s scope was too narrow because it only prohibited keyloggers
from obtaining personally identifiable information.153  Paul Koob, pri-
marily concerned with physical keyloggers, rejected the use of either
of these statutes because they did not protect adequately against physi-
cal keyloggers and they were too narrow in their prohibitions.154  Ac-
cordingly, Koob proposes to amend the ECPA’s definition of
electronic communication so that it no longer requires a “transfer,” in
order to protect against keyloggers in general.155  I disagree with him
on two points: First, altering the definition of “electronic
communication” so that it does not require a transfer renders the reg-
ulation impractical because it would require the government to
148 See Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1525, 110th Cong.
(2007); Securely Protect Yourself Against Cyber Trespass Act, H.R. 964, 110th Cong.
(2007).
149 See Koob, supra note 17, at 147 (“First, the bill provides no private right of action. R
This absence is a huge blow to preventing the use of keylogging devices, as prosecutorial
discretion may hamper the enforcement of any changes to the current federal
legislation.”).
150 See id.
151 See H.R. 964 § 2.
152 See id. § 4(b)(1) (“[T]he Commission may, in its discretion, seek a civil penalty for
such pattern or practice of violations in an amount, as determined by the Commission, of
not more than—(A) $3,000,000 for each violation of section 2; and (B) $1,000,000 for
each violation of section 3.”).
153 See Koob, supra note 17, at 148. R
154 See id. at 147–48.
155 See id. at 150.
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regulate inaction, instead of action that directly affects interstate com-
merce.  Second, physical keyloggers should be regulated by the CFAA,
not the ECPA, because they access a computer, not a communication.
B. The Dangers of Internet-Based Spyware and the Usage of
Information Through the Internet
1. Koob’s Solution
Koob’s idea of focusing on a small change to the ECPA is sound.
It is very difficult to pass new acts, as shown by the failure of the Spy
Act,156 especially when the act may deal with technology that many
consumers may not understand.  New sweeping legislation may intro-
duce new loopholes and create new problems, whereas amending old
laws to bridge the already existing gaps is a more practical exercise.
Courts have focused on what the definitions of “intercept” and “con-
temporaneous” mean in today’s age.157  Instead, Koob focuses on the
definition of electronic communication.158  However, Koob suggests
that the “interception problem,” the issue of how individuals obtain
the information, be removed from the definition of electronic com-
munication.159  If an electronic communication is not intercepted,
how is it received?  Even if the electronic communication is merely
“obtained,” the same problem presents itself: webcam pictures are not
protected, screenshot information is not protected, and information
gathered through the Internet is not protected.  The main problem
with the statute is not the manner in which the information is ob-
tained; courts are becoming more willing to accept that keyloggers
“intercept” electronic communications.160  The problem is with the
type of information that is not protected.
2. The Internet Presents Far More of a Danger to Privacy than
Physical Keyloggers
The ECPA protects information obtained by physical keyloggers
but leaves the data acquired by software keyloggers unprotected.  To
reiterate, a physical keylogger, like the KeyKatcher used in United
156 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. R
157 See, e.g., Klumb v. Goan, 884 F. Supp. 2d 644, 661 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (“The point is
that a program has been installed on the computer which will cause emails sent at some
time in the future through the internet to be rerouted automatically through the internet
to a third party address when the intended recipient opens the email for the first time.”);
Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-1104, 2012 WL 4049484, at *9 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2012)
(“Therefore, SpectorPro contemporaneously captured Plaintiff’s electronic communica-
tions within the meaning of the ECPA, and Defendants were able, if they were at the moni-
toring station while Plaintiff was using his Yahoo! email account, to view Plaintiff’s
communications as he viewed them.”).
158 See Koob, supra note 17, at 147–50. R
159 See id. at 150.
160 See supra Part II.B.2.
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States v. Ropp, is attached to a computer and captures electrical im-
pulses, thereby recording keystrokes from a computer.161  While it is
unclear whether or not courts will see this as an interception of an
electronic communication, this type of unauthorized physical access
could be protected by the CFAA.162  Regardless, this invasion of pri-
vacy is far less serious than the invasion of privacy presented by keylog-
ger software used through the Internet.  As discussed, keylogger
software such as SpectorPro and PC Rental Agent can obtain pictures
of a user through the webcam of the computer, record Internet his-
tory, locate the laptop or device in question, take screenshots of the
computer, and record all keystrokes.163  Furthermore, companies can
track Web preferences in order to provide targeted advertising, as well
as obtain the location of individuals from their cell phones.164  Most
of the time, the consequences of our actions are innocuous, so you
barely notice them.  When you browse a website, there is a targeted ad
for the shoes you were looking at yesterday.  On Facebook, you see an
ad for horseback riding lessons, and you remember that you added
horses to your interests last week.  You allow your movie application
on your phone to access your location so that you can determine
which showing you want to see at the local movie theater.  Some of
this information is used in ways you may not know about, and some of
it is used in ways that are very helpful for consumers.  Regulation is
needed, however, to prevent companies from overusing the informa-
tion that is gained through the Internet.  The tools that they use may
be simplified versions of the spyware that can access your entire com-
puter.  It may be possible for the information that companies obtain
through the Internet to be regulated by the ECPA, as well.
C. A Call for Greater Legislative Involvement
It is clear based on this analysis of the dangers of remotely accessi-
ble spyware and on the prior proposals to the current state of the
ECPA that something less drastic and more encompassing must be
done in order to protect consumers.  This is the time for Congress to
act, because of the recent public outrage that occurred when Edward
Snowden revealed the amount of information that the government
was able to obtain through the Internet from cell providers.165
Congress is already facing pressure to restrict the government and cor-
161 See United States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d 831, 831–32 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
162 See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1991).
163 See supra Part II.B.2.
164 See Witte, supra note 35, at 733–35 (“The software and service providers on our R
phones purportedly ask our permission to use our geolocation information for advertising
purposes.”).
165 See Edward Snowden: Timeline, supra note 137. R
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porate use of cell phone data.166  In light of the Edward Snowden fi-
asco, over two dozen privacy laws have passed across the country last
year.167  These states felt the pressure of public concern over the use
and collection of personal data and moved to protect their citizens.168
This is a clear indicator that it is time for the federal government to
update its privacy laws because widespread, national protection is the
best way to uniformly regulate data that can be accessed through the
Internet.  Congress must act to protect any information contained on
a computer that is accessible through the Internet to prevent any fur-
ther invasions of privacy like those the Byrds and the children in the
Lower Merion School District experienced.
CONCLUSION
The history of the ECPA has long been dotted with confusion.
Courts and commentators alike have been baffled by the statutory
construction, even after clarifying amendments and developed case
law.  The ECPA continues to be a confusing and inadequate protec-
tion for individual privacy.  There are many loopholes in the law that
courts have attempted to address. While e-mails have received more
protection from the courts, there are still problems related to e-mails
in storage, information stored on computers, remote activation of
webcams, and information gathering by Internet service providers.
The ECPA needs amending.  I propose that Congress amend the
definition of “electronic communication” to include “all information
accessible to a computer while it is connected to the Internet.”  This
definition accurately describes the breadth of private, yet accessible,
data that deserves the same level of protection currently afforded
e-mails.  This amendment will prevent corporations from spying on
individuals through private webcams and gathering screenshots, while
maintaining the traditional case law that is based on the definition of
contemporaneous intercept with electronic communication.  This
amendment will change the statute the least and have the least impact
on current court precedent, while enormously stretching protection
for the average consumer.  The time for Congress to act is now, when
the public is just beginning to realize that nothing, from a Web
browser to a Word document, is truly private.  I just covered my web-
cam.  Will you?
166 See Mark Jaycox, Congress Will Battle Over Internet Privacy in 2013, ELECTRONIC FRON-
TIER FOUND. (Jan. 31, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/01/congress-will-battle-
over-internet-privacy-2013.
167 See Somini Sengupta, No U.S. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/no-us-action-so-states-move-
on-privacy-law.html.
168 See id.
